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Veltri: Veltri: Role of Restraint

THE ROLE OF RESTRAINT IN
READING THE U.C.C.
Stephen C. Veltri*
Legal scholars have often quoted a line from a sermon delivered by
the Bishop of London before the King in 1715. The Bishop reminded the
monarch, "[W]hoever hath an absolute Authority to interpret any written,
or spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and
Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them."' Such
distinguished legal scholars as Felix Frankfurter and John Chipman Gray
undoubtedly remembered the Bishop's sermon because the sermon states
the dilemma courts face in their approach to statutes. 2 Shouldn't there be
marked constraints on a judge's ability to "legislate" in the guise of

legislative interpretation? On the other hand, if we absolutely eliminated
a judge's authority to interpret legislation won't our statutes soon become
rigid lifeless things?

These and related questions long have absorbed the finest legal minds
and this article makes no attempt to recover that ground.3 Rather, I seek
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, B.A., University
of Pittsburgh (1977); J.D., Georgetown University (1981); LL.M., Columbia University (1986).
I. HOADLEY, THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM OR CHURCH OF CMUST 12
(1717).

2. See J. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 102 (2d ed. 1921);
Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks On Statutory Interpretation, 47 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1949); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 533 (1947).
3. Today's leading scholars and judges have grappled with these questions.
See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR TE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); R.
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) (particularly chs. 6, 7, and 16); R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); A Symposium on Judicial
Activism: Problems and Responses, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 1 (1984); Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1983); Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800

(1983); Special Issue On Legislation: Statutory and. Constitutional Interpretation,
48 U. PITT. L. REv. 619 (1987); Tribe, Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Three
Axioms, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1988).
The questions, however, are perennial. Leading efforts of the past would
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tent. ed. 1958) and the articles, edited and collected

include H.

in 3, 3A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1986). A well-researched
historical survey is Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study In Form

and Substance, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 799 (1985).
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to explain how the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code hoped to
resolve these questions. The Code, when read as the drafters intended,
strikes a workable balance between the principle of judicial restraint in
reading statutes and the need for adaptability in the law.
By "judicial restraint," I mean the judge's sense of the limits of his
or her office. Our society divides the function of public law-making among
judicial, legislative, and administrative bodies. Each of these bodies has
institutional advantages over the others in addressing our society's needs
for law-making. Some law-making is done better judicially rather than
legislatively, but the reverse is also true.
When a judge interprets a statute the judge is law-making, as the good
Bishop said, and the judge is doing so with a considerable amount of
discretion. Among the principles which do, or at least should, limit the
judge's discretion is the principle of judicial restraint. A judge should
always consider the institutional competence of the court to render the
decision called for when he or she decides a case. When the judge questions
the competence of the court, he or she should defer to another law-making
agency better equipped to rule on the question raised. The first part of
this article will summarize recent efforts to describe the salient qualities
of each law-making institution in our society and to assess the types of
decisions each institution is best suited to make.
The second part of this article turns to the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Code is an unusual statute in many ways germane to the subject of
judicial interpretation. In particular, the Code posits its purposes and
policies as law,4 and then directs the judge to interpret its provisions
considering those purposes and policies.'

4. One of the first sections of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are

(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;

(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1987).
5. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1987) ("This Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."). The original drafts of

the Code also referred courts to the Official Comments of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Code had its genesis in Karl Llewellyn's

proposed revision of the Uniform Sales Act. Section IA of Llewellyn's second
draft of that Act declared the statute was "adopted for the purposes and with the
intent set forth in the official Comments ... ." I UNIroRM Co1&HRcUrL CODE
DRAr'rs 327 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1 U.C.C. DRAFrs]. By 1941,

the reference to the Comments was permissive only. The Act simply stated a court
"may consult" the Comments "to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and
policies" of the Act. 2 U~rro CoMmcMIA CODE DRAFTs 13 (E. Kelly ed. 1984).
Later versions of the Code dropped all reference to the comments in the text,
however, and section 1-102(2) is the major statement of policy in the current version
of the Code.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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This clear statement of policy helps balance the principle of judicial
restraint with the need for adaptability in the law. One stated purpose of
the Code is the modernization of commercial law by focusing on advances
in mercantile practices and customs. With this focus, the Code permits
innovation within a sphere where courts can make competent decisions.
Courts are well suited, institutionally, to take evidence of customs and
practices and make reasoned judgments on the basis of that evidence.
Courts are also able to make some normative decisions on the basis of
that evidence. They are not, however, equipped to make judgments on
larger questions of distributive justice like what will better the lot of
consumers, or the poor, or what amount of social resources groups like
these need. Questions of this nature are best left to the other law-making
institutions in our society and the Code directs the courts to avoid making
new law to serve policy concerns like these.
To illustrate the balance struck by the Code, the final part of this
article will discuss several judicial decisions under the Code. In some of
these decisions the courts have been unduly reticent about making farreaching decisions. They have refused unnecessarily to undertake a change
in the law, waiting for the legislature to act. These courts ignored their
mandate under the Code, to recognize and encourage the expansion of
commercial practice. In the other decisions, which this article will discuss,
the courts have made judgments inappropriately. Policies alien to the Code
drove the decisions, which are open to criticism because they ignore the
principle of judicial restraint implicit in the Code's policy statements.
I.

Tim

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE COURTS

In the past decade many commentators have tried to assess the institutional capability of the courts. Their studies have concentrated on identifying those types of decisions the judicial system can make. 6 As a result
of these efforts, a task force of twenty-six eminent judges, lawyers, and
scholars convened in 1978 under the auspices of the United States Department of Justice. This task force, the Council on the Role of the Courts
("CORC"), studied what courts can and cannot do effectively and issued
a final report in 1984.7

6. See, e.g., D. HoRowrrz, TBE CoURTs AND SOCi0 POLiCY (1977); Friendly,
The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. Mrm L. REv. 21

(1978); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978);

Rykind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96 (1976). But cf.
Cavanaugh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence
of Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 371 (1980).
7. COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF THE CouRTs, THE ROLE OF THE COuRTs IN
A.miwcAN SocIrTY (J. Lieberman ed. 1984) [hereinafter CORC REPORT]. The Council
was bipartisan. Its members were Sylvia Bacon, Richard J. Bartlett, John Cratsley,

Alice Daniel, Jane Frank Harman, Marvin E. Frankel, Lawrence M. Friedman,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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While the results of these studies are not unanimous, they do reveal
a rough consensus on the strengths and weaknesses of adjudication when
compared to other forms of social ordering. The studies draw considerably
on the work of Lon Fuller, who understood that different legal institutions
serve distinct purposes. 8 The process of adjudication as it has evolved in
our legal tradition has adapted itself well to resolving disputes but not to
other tasks. Legislatures, administrative bodies, or individuals better perform
many of these tasks. A comparison between adjudication and legislation
will help define the principle of judicial restraint, which is implicit in the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Both the CORC report and many of the other recent studies of the
advantages and disadvantages of adjudication over legislation have compared
the degree of participation in each process by the people affected by the
determination at issue.9 One hallmark of law-making through adjudication
is a high degree of participation in the process by relatively few people,
the parties to the suit. The legislative process, on the other hand, is lawmaking which involves many people with limited participation. These people
are the electorate who affect the outcome of legislation by their votes,
lobbying efforts, and the like.
In adjudication, the parties before the court control the information
presented to the judge by way of evidence and reasoned arguments. The
parties, indeed, "select" the dispute that they will present to the court.
To Lon Fuller, "the distinguishing feature of adjudication lies in the mode
of participation which it accords to the party affected by the decision."' 1
The degree of participation accorded to the litigants carries substantial
benefits. Every trial lawyer has seen the cathartic effect adjudication often
has on the parties. Litigants are often grateful that "they've had their
say." American law certainly has gained enormously from the self-selecting
process of adjudication. Who would deny, for example, that we are a
better society as a result of the NAACP's litigation efforts?"
This self-selecting process, controlled in many respects by the parties,

can, however, skew the policy decisions made through adjudication. There
Marc S. Galanter, Joel B. Grossman, Joseph W. Hatchett, Donald L. Horowitz,

Shirley M. Hufstedler, Benjamin Kaplan, Robert J. Kutak, Edward B. McConnell,
Harold Leventhal, Wade H. McCree, Jr., Carl McGowan, Robert B. McKay, Daniel
J. Meador, Archibald R. Murray, Charles B. Renfrew, Maurice Rosenberg, Frank
E.A. Sander, Antonin Scalia, Thomas C. Schelling, William B. Spong, Paul R.

Verkuil and Calvin Woodard. A. Leo Levin and Ernst John Watts served as
observers.
8. Id. at 95-100.
9. Id. at 88-89; D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 38-39; see also Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978).
10. Fuller, supra note 9, at 364.

11.

JUSTICE

For accounts of the NAACP litigation efforts see, R. KLUGER, SIMPLE
(1975); M. TUSIINET, THE NAACP's LITIGATION STRATEGY AGAINST SEG-

REGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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is no way, for example, for the system to assure that the first case brought
in the courts is representative. The first case may present particularly
appealing or unappealing facts for a policy change even though it rests
on exceptional facts. 12 Courts long have had misgivings about this limitation
on adjudication for making policy. For instance, it is a canon of judicial3
decision that a court's holding extends no further than the facts presented.'
This limitation helps assure that wholly unique cases do not shape policy.
Adjudication assures the litigants that they will have a say in "making"
the law that will determine their dispute. The narrow focus the parties
necessarily impart to the process, however, hinders the ability of the court
to assess the third-party effects of its decisions. Legislative bodies, on the
other hand, are more broadly representative. They are constituted in a way
that responds to the concerns of their constituents affected by a decision.
They, thus, have an institutional advantage in seeing third-party effects.
By the nature of the office, a legislator must consider how proposed
legislation will affect any number of groups in the legislator's constituency.
Moreover, the pace of the legislative process usually allows these groups
to make their views known. The control a constituent exercises over legislative decision making is, undoubtedly, much weaker than the hold a
litigant has on the judicial process. The legislative process, however, is
sharp
more likely to consider all the ramifications of a policy change. The
4
process.1
the
blind
not
does
parties
of
number
limited
a
of
focus

12. Judge Friendly has expressed concern that "[w]hile courts are, or should
be, aware of the effects of their decisions beyond the case sub judice, their response
is often triggered by outrageous facts that may not be at all representative."
Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMi
L. REv. 21, 22-23 (1978). Judge Friendly cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in
which the Supreme Court refashioned the juvenile justice system. The facts before
the Court were particularly shocking and undoubtedly atypical. A juvenile court
had sentenced a fifteen year old to six years of detention for making obscene
phone calls. Friendly, supra, at 22 n.6. For a more extended discussion of this
case, see D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 171-219.
13. John Marshall gave a classic statement of this principle:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very
point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered
in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing
on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821).
14. CORC REPORT, supra note 7, at 89; D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at
38-51. Justice Frankfurter wrote that because courts lack representative character,
"[t]hey are not ... a good reflex of a democratic society." Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Another attribute of adjudication is that a proper judicial decision is
an impartial, rational result."s Rational arguments of the parties before the
court shape the judge's decision, resulting in a reasoned opinion. Nevertheless, this aspect of the process does not lend itself to some types of
decisions. For example, courts often have difficulty fashioning per se rules
that draw clear lines. Line drawing is arbitrary, not rational. No reasoned
basis exists, for example, for deciding that filing a financing statement
within ten days as opposed to fourteen days perfects a purchase money
security interest. Many judicial attempts at fashioning per se rules have
failed when the facts of a later case pressured the court to shift its line
16
or abandon it altogether.
Lon Fuller grasped a more subtle result of the resort to reasoned
argument that characterizes the judicial process. Litigants must present their
positions as principled arguments, therefore, every issue presented to the
courts necessarily develops into a claim of right. This reasoned approach

dictates a final result stated as an entitlement.' 7 Professor Fuller illustrated
how the process of adjudication or arbitration converts a cause into a
claim of right with the following example:
We may see this process of conversion in the case of an employee
who desires an increase in pay. If he asks his boss for a raise, he may,
of course, claim "a right" to the raise. He may argue the fairness of the
principle of equal treatment and call attention to the fact that Joe, who
is no better than he, recently got a raise. But he does not have to rest
his plea on any ground of this sort. He may merely beg for generosity,
urging the needs of his family. Or he may propose an exchange, offering
to take on extra duties if he gets the raise. If, however, he takes his case
to an arbitrator he cannot, explicitly at least, support his case by an appeal
to charity or by proposing a bargain. He will have to support his demand
by a principle of some kind, and a demand supported by principle is the
same thing as a claim of right. So, when he asks his boss for a raise,
he may or may not make a claim of right; when he presents his demand
to an arbitrator he must make a claim of right.,
Demands on the legislative process need not be, and often are not,
cast in rights or principles.' 9 Indeed, an understanding of the legislative

15. Fuller, supra note 9, at 365-69.
16. Consider Justice Holmes' attempt to fashion a per se rule "once and
for all" which would mandate that an automobile driver approaching a railroad
track "stop and look" for any approaching train. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman,
275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927). The rule fell under the reason of another case in an
opinion penned by Justice Cardozo only seven years later. See Pokora v. Wabash
Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 102-03 (1934).
17. Fuller, supra note 9, at 365-69.

18. Id. at 369.
19. See Easter R.R. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 65 U.S. 127 (1961), where
the court stated:
The right of the people to inform their representative in government of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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process begins with the recognition that it is a forum for the resolution
of the interests of many different interest groups. 20 The resolution often
depends upon compromise or the "making of a deal," which would be
misleading if characterized as "principled" in any way.2' Concern for
potential lack of principle in the legislative process may be the best reason

for constitutional restrictions on bills of attainer.2 The problem remains
vivid for anyone who has seen a videotape of Senator Joe McCarthy
conducting a legislative hearing.

Nevertheless, because adjudication ultimately results in conflicting claims
of right, it is less appropriate for resolving certain problems than other
social ordering mechanisms. Every practicing lawyer knows this. When a
complainant files a complaint, settlement discussions become less flexible,
positions more fixed, and compromise more difficult. In particular, the
room for "deals" in the legislative process makes it a better forum for
social policy decisions affecting several groups with different goals. In
legislatures, a group seeking a policy change may get the "half of loaf"
which does not unduly alienate the other contending groups. 23 Legislatures

also have much more flexibility than courts in fashioning solutions to social
problems. Courts, once they have upheld a litigant's claim of right, must
fashion a judgment or decree which is fundamentally coercive. Conversely,
legislatures can mold behavior through tax incentives, grant programs and
a host of other measures much more flexible than a broad proscription
of conduct.?
Nearly all the recent efforts to evaluate the limits of adjudication have
focused on the limited fact-finding ability of the courts2-partly because
of the control the litigants have over the fact-finding process. Other aspects
of the process, however, limit the courts' ability to find certain facts that

their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot
properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither
unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that
they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors.
Id. at 139.
20. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, Tim AvmRicAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS
AND THE STATES

334 (1964) ("The legislature is the natural habitat of political

interest groups."); R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 262-67 (1985). A more active role
for the courts sometimes is justified because the legislative process is too tied to
interest groups. Tribe, Seven PluralistFallacies:In Defense of the Adversary ProcessA Reply To Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 43, 43 n.3 (1978).
21. R. PoSNER, supra note 3, at 269; Fuller, supra note 9, at 400.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
23. See CORC REPORT, supra note 7, at 104; D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6,
at 35; Fuller, supra note 9, at 400.
24. See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 35.
25. CORC REPORT, supra note 7, at 105-08; D. HoRowTrz, supra note 6,
at 45-51; Friendly, supra note 12, at 23.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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have a major bearing on social policy decisions. The discovery process,
rules of evidence, and the trial process all are designed to frame issues
and find facts involving past events or present circumstances. 26 The courts
did not design these processes to evaluate socio-economic data or to find
means of regulating future behavior. 27 One leading scholar has characterized
aptly the types of facts courts handle well. These are "historic" facts; the
ones that create problems for the courts are "social" and "consequential"
facts.28
The judicial process has adapted itself well to find specific, historical
facts of incredible detail. Was it raining on a day in question? What did
the defendant say? Is the witness lying? The process also can make fine
judgments about behavior within the realm of common experience. Did
the defendant act like a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances? 29 Was the misstatement "material" in its effect on the judgment
of an ordinary investor?30 Courts, through expert witnesses, even can make
well-informed judgments on questions directed to the behavior of the parties
and witnesses in court. Did the doctor perform to the standards of the

26. This is a major conclusion of CORC REPORT, supra note 7, at 105-08.
Several excellent articles have addressed judicial limitations in finding the facts that
inform social policy decisions often criticizing the courts for procedural improprieties
in their consideration of such facts. See Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM.
L. RiEv. 931 (1980); Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System
and the Flow of Information to the Justices; A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L.
REv. 1187 (1975).
27. Consider, for example, an age discrimination case in which a bus company
refused to hire drivers over forty years old. The company defended on the ground
age was a bona fide occupational qualification. Thus, the court was presented with
a rather simple social science question-are younger drivers safer drivers-yet, it
found the process of adjudication ill-suited to arriving at an answer. On appeal
the court of appeals noted:
This record illustrates the relative inadequacy of the traditional adversary Court record procedure against the greater latitude of an administrative hearing. Along with the deposition of its expert witness, the
government sought to introduce 28 various and assorted publications by
eminent authorities on the effects of aging upon functional abilities. Although many of these articles contain the results of many scientific studies
and analyses which were relevant and had a direct bearing on the questions
under consideration, the trial judge felt compelled under prevailing evidentiary rules to sustain such objections as to the admission of 18 of the
documents.
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 243 n.50 (5th Cir. 1976).
28.

D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 45-51.

29. See Gibson v. City of Pasadena, 83 Cal. App. 3d 651, 148 Cal. Rptr.
68 (1978); Lee v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 143 Ill. App. 3d 500, 492 N.E.2d 1364
(1986); Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 320 N.E.2d 853 (1974).
30. S.E.C. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis.
1978); see also T.S.C. Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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medical profession? 3' Was the defendant insane?32 Courts usually handle
questions like these quite capably.
The courts, however, have difficulty handling the larger, behavioral

questions that inform social policy decisions. A leading analysis published
by the Brookings Institution succinctly describes the problem:
The increasing involvement of the courts in social policy questions
has increased the number and importance of social fact questions in
litigation. As the courts move into new, specialized, unfamiliar policy
areas, they are confronted by a plethora of questions about human behavior
that are beyond their ability to answer on the basis of common experience
or the usual modicum of expert testimony ....
Obtaining answers to such behavioral questions has become exigent,
and not only because the interstices in which courts make fresh policy
keep expanding. If a judge or a jury makes a mistake of fact relating

only to the case before it, "the effects of the mistake are quarantined."
But if the factual materials form the foundation for a general policy, the
consequences cannot be so confined.
Traditionally, the courts have been modest about their competence to
ascertain social facts and have tried to leave this function primarily to
other agencies. They have shielded themselves by applying doctrines that
have the effect of deferring to the fact-finding abilities of legislatures and
administrative bodies, to avoid having to establish social facts in the course
of litigation.
The reasons for this general modesty are well grounded. There is
tension between two different judicial responsibilities: deciding the particular
case and formulating a general policy. Two different kinds of fact-finding
processes are required for these two different functions. The adversary
system of presentation and the rules of evidence were both developed for
the former, and they leave much to be desired for the latter. 3"

Even proponents of an expansive judicial role in shaping social policy
recognize that the traditional process of adjudication limits the courts'
ability to find social facts.3 4 Proponents for an expanded judicial role
inevitably call for institutional innovations to remedy the deficiencies, such
as the increased use of special masters or court-appointed experts. Some
of the proposed innovations would result in a process that bears little

31. See Durflinger v. Artules, 234 Kan. 484, 60 P.2d 86 (1983); Hahn v.
Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Md. App. 685, 461 A.2d 7 (1983); Brown v. Koulizakis,
229 Va. 524, 331 S.E.2d 440 (1985).
32. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970); State v. Leonard,
300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980).
33. D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 46-47.
34. See Miller & Barron, supra note 26, at 1233-45; Tribe, supra note 20,
at 52-53. Critics of the view that courts are ill-suited for social policy decisions
have argued the courts have already made significant changes in their processes to

fit themselves for such decisions. Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts:
Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudenceof Judicial Competence, 14 LAw & Soc. Ruv.
371 (1980); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAgv.
L. REv. 1281 (1976).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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resemblance to the way the nation's courts currently conduct the process
of adjudication. For example, one commentator has suggested judges might
adopt notice and comment procedures similar to those employed in administrative rule-making. 5 Other commentators have suggested that appellate
courts retain a resident panel of social scientists. 6 That commentators have
even suggested such major changes shows that many deeply feel the institutional limitation of the courts.
The inability of the courts to monitor the consequences of their decisions
is another weakness of adjudication which impairs the ability of the courts
to fashion sound social policy. Judges have no institutional means to follow
up on their decisions. Unlike courts, an administrative agency can require
compliance reports; a legislature can check the results through the complaints
of constituent groups, or the use of oversight hearings and reports.37
One final point of comparison is, once again, both a great strength
and weakness of adjudication. Adjudication is piecemeal-"the supreme
example of incremental decision-making."" In its traditional form, litigation
finally resolves only the dispute presented by the parties. The court's ruling
in the adjudication affects only the most narrow question necessary to the
decision. The result is binding in a subsequent case only under the doctrine
of stare decisis.3 9 In a later decision, the court can limit its holding to the
special circumstances of the prior case and, thus, have little influence on
4
policy. 0
This type of incremental decision-making has several disadvantages. It
is often unclear, for example, what "sweep" a judicial decision will have.
Lawyers often ponder over precedent in planning transactions and evaluating
claims. Judicial decisions can be ambiguous in that later courts might read
41
any given precedent narrowly or broadly.
Legislative enactments, on the other hand, can impart certainty. They
do so, however, at a cost. Legislation, that is a sharply defined proscription
of general application, can be an unwieldy and rigid instrument of social
control. To paraphrase a classic example, legislation cannot inalterably set

35. Tribe, supra note 20, at 53.
36. Miller & Barron, supra note 26, at 1240-42.
37. D. HoRowrrz, supra note 6, at 51.
38. Id.at 35.
39. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468
(1987); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
40. See Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 832
(1946) (regarding its commerce clause decisions) ("especially in this field opinions
must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation
with their special facts").
41. A classic lecture to law students advised them to read each case "from
the angle as its maximum value as a precedent" and then "for its minimum value
... to set against the maximum." K. LLEwELLYN, THE BRAsuL- BusH 69 (1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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an effective speeding law at 55 miles per hour. 42 Such a law would not
allow for bad weather. So, the state invariably qualifies their speeding laws
with language which requires drivers to operate their cars in a "reasonable
and prudent" manner notwithstanding any posted limit. 43 This qualification
enables the courts applying the statute to recognize special circumstances.
Here, the piecemeal nature of adjudication is a great strength. When
a court interprets this type of statutory qualification, it is acting within
an area in which it is uniquely competent. It will be making a fact specific
inquiry which focuses on the conduct of the parties before the court. Over
time judicial interpretations of the qualification will yield evolving standards
of "reasonable and prudent" driving. The great advantage to law-making
through adjudication is that it permits flexible application and changing
standards that are not a sharp break with the past. In Dean Calebresi's
phrase, adjudication, because of its "incremental nature," allows for both
"continuity and change." 44 The common law evolves slowly to be sure; it
nevertheless adapts to a changing world. Legislation is simply much less
adaptable.
To summarize, courts perform some tasks very well. When they make
law in their incremental fashion, they can impart an important ingredient

of adaptability into the law. They are well adapted to make specific inquiries
into past events or present circumstances affecting the parties before the
court. They must justify their rulings with reasons. This makes courts wellequipped to make decisions grounded upon claims of right.
What legislatures do better than courts, however, is tackle problems
arising from what Lon Fuller has called "polycentric" situations:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web.
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern
throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all
likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather
create a differeht complicated pattern of tensions. This would certainly
occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker
strands to snap. This is a "polycentric" situation because it is "many
centered"-each crossing of stands is a distinct center for distributing
tensions.41
According to Fuller, administrative or legislative handling of polycentric
problems is often better than handling them judicially. One example chosen
by Fuller concerns the assignment of players to a football team. It would

42. The example is from H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 3, at 131-32,
138-41.
43. Compare 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3361 (Purdon 1977) ("No person
shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
conditions ....") with 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3362 (Purdon 1977) (statutorily
defined maximum speed limits).
44. G. CALEBRMSI, supra note 3, at 3-4.
45. Fuller, supra note 9, at 395.
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be unwise to assign the quarterback position by having the contending
players litigate:
Other players on the team are necessarily affected. It is not merely a
matter of eleven different men being possibly affected; each shift of any

one player might have a different set of repercussions on the remaining
players: putting Jones in as quarterback would have one set of carry over

effects, putting him in as left end, another. Here, again, we are dealing
with a
with a situation of interacting points of influence and therefore
polycentric problem beyond the proper limits of adjudication. 46
Courts cannot adequately address a polycentric problem because only
the parties to the suit before the court contribute to the judge's understanding of the problem. Third parties affected by the "pull" of the
decision have virtually no access to the adjudicative process. Moreover,
the court has virtually no way, apart from a subsequent case, to monitor
the "pull" of its decision. Finally, as Fuller and others have suggested,
adjudication works best when one party is right and the other wrong. It
can also balance competing claims of right among few parties. It cannot,

however, effectively order multiple claims of right and other preferences.
Fuller notes that all social problems have polycentric features. With
some decisions, however, these features predominate and Fuller believes
that administrative or legislative resolution of these problems is better. In
particular, Fuller concludes, as have many others, that courts are poorly
equipped to assign economic resources. Decisions of this nature, involving
redistribution of resources throughout society, are too polycentric for effective adjudication. 47
This review of recent literature on the attributes of courts and legislation
gives meaning to the principle of judicial restraint-the subject of the
remainder of this article. Simply stated, the principle would oblige a judge
faced with a "polycentric" problem to be cautious in making new law,
to rest his or her decision on the narrowest ground possible, and to defer
to legislative or administrative bodies on any proposed policy change. When
a problem resting on specific, historic facts implicating most directly the
rights of the litigants alone faces a court, the court can and should be
more confident about its ability to tackle the problem. It should not be
unduly deferential to other law making agencies. In this instance, the courts
can confidently shape the law in an evolving tradition.
The next part of this article will describe how the Uniform Commercial
Code embodies the principle of judicial restraint, understood in this fashion.
II.

THE DESIGN OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Any discussion of the interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) must begin with a caveat. The provisions of the Code vary so

46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 400; see also Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA.

L. REv. 715 (1978).
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widely in style, purpose, and effect that no general description of the
Code's nature as a legislative enictment is possible. Some commentators,
for example, have sought to describe the UCC as a "true Code," essentially
a codification of principle.4 8 Others, on the 49
other hand, have found the
UCC a loose collection of unrelated statutes.
Both observations include elements of truth. Indeed, the debate is much
like the controversy among the blind men of Hindustan examining an
elephant.5 0

48. See Franklin, On The Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 LAw & CoNTEMp. PRoBs. 330 (1951).
49. See Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of The Uniform
Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321.
50. It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind.
The First approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to bawl:
"God bless me!-but the Elephant
Is very like a wall!"
The Second, feeling of the tusk,
Cried: "Ho!-what have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me 't is mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant
Is very like a spear!"
The Third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Thus bodily up and spake:
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a snake!"
The Fourth reached out his eager hand,
And felt about the knee.
"What most this wondrous beast is like Is mighty plain, quoth he;
"'T is clear enough the Elephant
Is very like a tree!"
The Fifth, who chanced to tough the ear,
Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can,
This marvel of an Elephant
Is very like a fan!"
The Sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Some parts of the Code do look like codifications of principle.', These
provisions are laden with open-textured terms which invite judicial lawmaking. For example, a party to a sales contract has the right to "adequate
assurance of due performance" from the other party when "reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise." '5 2 A party to a negotiable instrument whose
"own negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of the
instrument" cannot raise the alteration as a defense against a payor acting
in "good faith and in accordance with ...

reasonable commercial stan-

dards." ' 53 In markedly "unstatutory" language, the section of the Code
that purports to define the scope of Article 5 openly invites judge made
law:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of
letters of credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act
or may hereafter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not
by itself require, imply or negate application of the same or a converse

That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant

Is very like a rope!"
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!
J. SAxE, THE POEMS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE (1879).

51. Some of the "unifying" principles of the Code are so variously defined
that one must question the internal consistency of the codification. For example,
the principle of "good faith" is defined subjectively in Article I (General Provision).
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1987) ("honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"). However, in Article 2 (Sales), the term good faith has an objective
component when applied to merchants. U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (1987) ("honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade"). In Articles 3 (Commercial Paper), 4 (Bank Deposits-Collections), 6 (Bulk
Transfers), 7 (Documents of Title) and 9 (Secured Transactions), we return to the
subjective definition despite the fact we are often dealing with persons of considerable
expertise like banks, warehousemen, and merchants, whose conduct could be measured by objective, commercial standards. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 4-108, 6-107,
7-209, 9-206 (1987) (all require the subjective measure of good faith). Finally, in
Article 8 (Investment Securities), "good faith" is defined both objectively and
subjectively. The good faith purchaser of Article 8 is expected to act honestly in
fact. U.C.C. § 8-302 (1987). Professional agents and brokers of securities, though,
must observe reasonable commercial standards. U.C.C. § 8-318 (1987). Most confusingly, trustees, transfers agents, and registrars seem to be held to the subjective
standard when one reads the text of section 8-406 but the objective standard when
one looks at the Official Comments. See U.C.C. § 8-406 comment 3 (1987). Article
5 (Letters of Credit) also goes both ways. CompareU.C.C. § 5-108 (1987) (subjective)
with U.C.C. § 5-109 (1987) (objective).
52. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1987).
53. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this
Article.'
The Code, indeed, is replete with common law terms like "reasonableness," "wrongful," "proximate," "diligence," "ordinary care," "good
faith," and "breach of the peace." '55 Many provisions of the Code, however,
are rather formal, in the sense that they draw clear lines calling for
mechanical application by the courts. Thus, a secured party must file a
financing statement for a purchase money security interest within ten days
to maintain continuous perfection.56 The Code sets out in detail the formal
requisites of negotiable instruments5 7 financing statements, 5 notices of bulk
sales,5 9 and security agreementsA0 Even Article 2 on Sales, commonly viewed
as the most open-textured of the Code, has several sharply defined provisions. For example, a merchant must object in writing within ten days
to any confirmation of sale. 61 Firm offers are irrevocable for no more
than 90 days. 62
It is important to remember the function of these "hard and fast"
rules when one thinks about interpretation of the Code. These rules impart
certainty to the Code and tend to predominate in provisions on the documentation of transactions. They, therefore, allow for certain counseling
and predictable business planning. Unlike the open-textured provisions of
the Code, courts generally apply these rules in a straight-forward fashion.
They operate like the 55 mph speed limit in drawing a clear line. This
article, as most of the commentary on the Code, concentrates on the Code's
open-textured provisions. The formal rules, however, do limit judicial
interpretation.6 3 If the Code says "ten days," a court should not, and

54. U.C.C. § 5-102 (1987).
55. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-306(1), 2-309(1), 2-311(1), 2-704(2), 3-419(37), 4403, 4-108(2), 4-202(1), 4-402, 7-204, 7-309, 7-404, 8-405, 9-503, 9-504(3) (1987).
56. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1987).
57. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1987).
58. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1987).
59. U.C.C. § 6-107 (1987).
60. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1987).
61. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1987).
62. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1987).
63. An outstanding article on the interpretation of the Code demonstrates
how one's view of the Code can be distorted by viewing only the open-textured
provisions. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975). Looking only at the most open-textured
provisions of Article 2, Professor Danzig writes that central value decisions were
left for judicial decision and describes the Code as "a renunciation of legislative
responsibility and power." Id. at 622. Professor Danzig's view may have been
tempered by a different focus, which included some of the more formal rules where
"legislative" lines are drawn around some value laden issues. For example, Section
9-204 has always limited a secured creditor's ability to obtain a security interest
in a consumer's after-acquired property to that property acquired by the consumer

within ten days of the creditor's disbursement of funds. U.C.C. § 9-204. (1987).
To cite an example from Article 2, the Code invalidates any limitation of liability
U.C.C.
transaction.
injuries
arising School
from aofconsumer
for personal
Published
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1989 § 2-719(3) (1987).
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usually will not, hold the legislature meant "fifteen days" under any theory
of interpretation.
The Code's principal authors designed it to perform two separate tasks
which are seemingly difficult to reconcile. 64 The drafters of the Code wished
to impart certainty to the law with a Code they hoped would be adaptable. 6
They tried to accomplish these goals, in part, with the dichotomy of rules.
Drafting documents and counseling clients on form is relatively certain
under the Code's mechanistic rules. They also attempt to accomplish their
objectives by codifying a method of interpreting the Code which would,
in Dean Calabresi's words, impart a measure of both continuity and
change."
The Code contains a number of provisions in its first article which
the drafters hoped would guide the manner in which the Code would be
read.67 Karl Llewellyn hoped to recreate what he called a "Grand Style"
of judicial decision-making. 8 Llewellyn viewed the methods of several
leading eighteenth and nineteenth century common law judges as paradigms.
He sought to recapture what he perceived as the style of decision employed
by Lord Mansfield, Cowen and Kent of New York, and others. To Llewellyn, the greatness of these judges' decisions lay in their clear articulation
of the guiding principle of decision applicable to the factual setting at
issue. The great decisions did not rest on slavish devotion to precedent.
Nevertheless, they imparted certainty in the law, by a clear statement of
the policy the great judges sought to serve. 69
Llewellyn believed these judges arrived at the principles that informed
their decisions by not drawing their "eye off the commercial issues in a
commercial cause." ' 70 If courts concentrate on the policy of facilitating
64. The Code's principal authors were Karl N. Llewellyn, Soia Mentschikoff,

William Prosser, Fairfax Leary, Jr., Fredrich Kessler, Charles Bunn, Louis B.

Schwartz, Allison Dunham and Grant Gilmore. 1 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFoRM CoMMERCIAL CODE SEEms § 1-101:01 (1984). This article focuses on the General Provisions

(Article 1) of the Code drafted by Karl N. Llewellyn.
65. In the Forward to the Report and Second Draft of the Revised Uniform
Sales Act (one of the first "drafts" of the UCC), William A. Schnader, President
of the National Conference on Uniform State Law, phrased the goal as a "commercial code both flexible and calculable of result, both lasting and adjustable."
I U.C.C. DRArrs, supra note 5, at 273.
66. G. CALEBRESI, supra note 3, at 3.
67. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102 to -104, 1-106, 1-109, 1-203 to -205 (1987).

68. Report and second Draft of the Uniform Sales Act, 1 U.C.C. DRAPTs,

supra note 5, at 293. See K. LLEWELLYN, TnE ComioN LAW TRADITION, DEcmNo
APPEALS (1960) (discusses the "Grand Style"). The book's dedication page lists the
judges whose work exemplifies the "Grand Style." Gilmore called this period of
legal history when judges decided cases in this style "our Golden Age." GILmoRE,
THE AGES OF AMERicAN LAW 12 (1977). Llewellyn recalled Pound's characterization
of the era as "our classic period." K. LLEWELLYN, supra, at 5.
69. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 68, at 35-69.
70. Id. at 412.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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commercial interchange and state that policy clearly, judicial decisions will
be predictable. 7
A few quotations from Lord Mansfield's decisions ably illustrate the
Grand Style. 72 Lord Mansfield first articulated the need for certainty emanating from a common sense rule well adapted to the commercial transaction at hand:
The property of merchants should not depend upon subtle niceties
and speculative refinements drawn from the Roman jus postliminii, but
upon plain reason. We desire it may be understood, that the only point
now determined is, that on a valued policy a plaintiff cannot recover more
when he chooses to
than actual
73 loss which has happened, at the time
abandon.
How does one master the facts that will lead to the common sense74
principle and develop what Llewellyn called the "life-reason" of a rule?
Mansfield, again, had a clear answer. The court should rely heavily on
the customs of merchants, the course of trade, and evidence of commercial
practices. 75 How does the judge inform himself about these practices?
Mansfield did not simply rely upon evidence adduced by the parties; he
impaneled merchant juries to advise him on commercial usage. 76 Does this
mean he blindly followed commercial practices? No, he recognized at least
two important exceptions. When prior decisions had arrived at a firm and
certain result that made commercial sense, he would not alter the rule of
decision through evidence of commercial usage. In a leading case, he reversed
himself on admitting the opinion of a merchant on blank endorsements
when two prior adjudications had resolved the question contrary to the
merchant's opinion. Mansfield chastised himself for admitting the evidence
because the legal question was settled and "no particular usage" ought to
"weigh against it." Admitting the evidence ran the risk of sending "everything to sea again." ' 77 Mansfield's second exception to the reception of
merchant practices was that he would not countenance sharp practice or
dishonesty. Good faith animated the best commercial practice. Mansfield
saw bad faith as a lack of full disclosure or concealment. His focus, thus,

71.

1 U.C.C. DRArTs, supra note 5, at 308-09.

72. Grant Gilmore, a protege of Llewellyn's and one of the Code's principal
draftsmen, once wrote: "As a general rule, anything ... which was good enough
for Lord Mansfield was good enough for Llewellyn." Gilmore, Formalism and the
Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CEiGTrrON L. REv. 441, 460-61 (1979).
73. Hamilton v. Mendez, 96 Eng. Rep. 154, 156 (1761).
74. K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 68, at 404.
75. See, e.g., Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (1758) (where Mansfield,
upon resolving a question of commercial law, reached the result dictated by "the
general course of business").
76. See Glover v. Black, 96 Eng. Rep. 240, 241 (1763); Camden v. Cowley,
96 Eng. Rep. 237, 238 (1763); Lewis v. Rucker, 97 Eng. Rep. 769, 770, 772 (1761).

77. Edie & Laird v. East India Co., 96 Eng. Rep. 166, 167 (1761).
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was on how the parties to a contract entered their agreement. He undertook
a fact-specific inquiry, concentrating on the unique circumstances of the
case before him. Mansfield would upset an agreement for lack of good
faith only if his examination, using the process of adjudication in a task

to which it is well-suited, convinced him that the litigant had a flawed
bargain.78
It is clear from the earliest drafts of the Code that its principal author,
Karl Llewellyn, wished to codify Mansfield's methods.7 9 The impetus for
drafting the Code was a perception of pronounced "discrepancies between
the doctrine of the [Uniform Sales] Act and current commercial needs." 80
To Llewellyn, sales law had become a "lawyer's law" foreign to the "very
field of everyday business."'" When Llewellyn began work on the Code,
he felt the case law on sales exhibited an "unbelievable discrepancy" with
"commercial needs.' '82
Llewellyn's report accompanying an early draft of the Code opined
that the judiciary caused the discrepancy by losing touch with the Grand
Style of decision with its focus on modern commercial practice:
The trouble has lain primarily in the failure of the case-law of Sales,

since about 1850, to develop with any consistency a set of concepts and
lines of legal analysis so built as to focus the issues that arose when the
mercantile world moved out of the regime of marketing by factorage and
into the regime of contracts to sell made between parties at a distance
from each other. Unfocused issues mean blurred results and blurred rules
difficult to foresee, even for a lawyer ....1

The answer for the drafters was a codification of common-law principles-provisions with a clear purpose and reason. By emulating the Grand

78. Mansfield described his standard of good faith as follows:
The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good

faith forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw
the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact and his believing
the contrary ....This definition of concealment, restrained to the efficient
motives and precise subject of any contract, will generally hold to make
it void, in favor of the party misled by his ignorance of the thing
concealed.... The reason of the rule which obliges parties to disclose is
to prevent fraud and to encourage good faith. It is adapted to such facts
as vary the nature of the contract; which one privately knows and the
other is ignorant of and has no reason to suspect. The question, therefore,
must always be, "Whether there was, under all the circumstances, at the
time the policy was underwritten, a fair representation or a concealment;
fraudulent, if designed, or, though not designed, varying materially the
object of the policy and changing the risk understood to be run."
Carter v. Boehm, 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164-65 (1766) (emphasis added).
79. 1 U.C.C. D-AFrs, supra note 5, at 294, 318; see also K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 68, at 404.
80. 1 U.C.C. DRAFrs, supra note 5, at 288.
81. Id. at 288-89.
82. Id. at 288.
83. Id.at 289.
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Style of Mansfield and others, they hoped to achieve both certainty and
adaptability in a semi-permanent code. The aim was to create a code that
stated common law principle.8 4 Echoing the Grand Style, the authors of
the Code worked on the basis of the "proposition that if the reason in
life of a situation be clearly grasped and stated, and the reason of its
solution be made clear to the courts, there results both immediately and
over the long haul a more reckonable course of decision and a more
reckonable body of interpretation than can be had by any other statutory
85
device which is not to be overhauled and rebuilt every two years, or five."
To inform judicial decisions of the "reason in life" in a flexible code,
the drafters relied on the explicit recognition and accommodation of good
merchant practices. 86 They codified sound and lasting practices with their
reasons explained in the official comments 7 Trade usage and customs
would be the source for future law and interpretation of the Code's open
ended provisions. The drafters based the Code on Llewellyn's study of
Anglo-American commercial law since Mansfield. That study convinced
Llewellyn that the best commercial code would single out certain commercial
a mechanism to allow
practices for explicit recognition and then, provide
88
the law to adapt to new mercantile practices.
Again, the drafters did not design the Code to countenance all practices
of trade. The Code, like Mansfield, has, since its inception, required good
faith from all parties.89 The courts must be the final arbiter of sound
practices. The Code since its earliest drafts, however, has presumed reasonable any established trade usage. A lack of good faith will upset a
practice under the Code only if it rises to the level of dishonesty and sharp
practice condemned by Mansfield. °

84. Id. at 302-10.
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. at 334-35.
87. Id. at 299, 305, 327, 329-30.
88. Llewellyn described the role of commercial practice in one of the Code's
initial drafts:
[Certain mercantile practices have had great lasting power: the seller's
responsibility for quality and condition, for example, has been mercantile
practice for two centuries and a half, and has fought its way back into
legal recognition despite the bad law made on the matter by the courts
of the early 19th Century ....Where the Draft has picked out practices
for explicit recognition, they are practices whose essential reason, in this
perspective, seems to lie deep, seems to serve a real need of typical and
lasting character, and seems to have already proved itself in that aspect.
Practices which have not been affirmatively shown to have these characteristics are left to be drawn in under "mercantile usage" or the "usage

of the trade" as it may from time to time shift.
Id. at 309.
89. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b) (1987).
90. For example, the comments to the Code from its earlier drafts until
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The need to have trade practices invigorate the law led Llewellyn in
the early drafts of the Code to revive Mansfield's merchant jury. Llewellyn's
1941 draft of the Revised Sales Act established a procedure for impaneling
a jury of disinterested merchant experts. 91 The comments to that proposed
section make very clear that Llewellyn distrusted the standard fact-finding
processes of adjudication-judges, juries, and expert witnesses. "The need
for speedy, reliable, and therefore reasonable and reckonable, determination
of questions of mercantile fact underline all Sales law. The unspecialized
character of our courts brings it about that few judges have specialized
skill in such matters ... and juries are notoriously out of touch." 92
Most of the legal realists shared Llewellyn's concern for the limits of
adjudication and this concern affected their views on how courts should

interpret statutes. Jerome Frank, for example, suggested that judicial deference to legislative policy decisions was necessary because "conflicting
interests" were represented in the legislature in a manner in which the

narrow focus of adjudication simply did not permit. 93 Frank had misgivings
about the fact-finding ability of the courts when it came to social policy
questions. Thus, when counsel argued before Judge Jerome Frank that he
should construe a tax statute to read a "more just result," Frank decided:
Such a remaking of the legislation would require consideration of questions
of legislative policy bearing on fiscal and economic matters and on administrative convenience; to discharge that task efficiently we would be
obliged to hold a sort of Congressional Committee hearing, at which all
interested persons would be heard, so as to be sure that our amendment
would not entail unforeseen and undesirable results.94
To the realists, the judiciary abused statutes by applying the formal maxims
of interpretation to statutory language. The results often defied common

today, have always indicated that a heavy burden weighs against any party wishing
to challenge an established commercial practice as unconscionable. See U.C.C. §
1-205 comment 6 (1987).
The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts
and clauses applies to implicit clauses which rest on usage of trade and
carries forward the policy underlying the ancient requirement that a custom
or usage must be "reasonable." However, the emphasis is shifted. The
very fact of commercial acceptance makes out a prima facia case that the
usage is reasonable and the burden is no longer on the usage to establish
itself as being reasonable. But the anciently established policing of usage
by the courts is continued to the extent necessary to cope with the situation
arising if an unconscionable or dishonest practice should become standard.
Id.

91.

1 U.C.C. DPAyrs, supra note 5, at 531-37.

92. Id. at 531.
93. Frank, supra note 2, at 1266.
94. Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
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95
sense in the realists' view and frustrated the purpose of much legislation.
For these reasons, the realist developed a method of approaching statutes
that concentrated on the legislative purpose, not any rule or canon of
construction. 96 By focusing on legislative purpose to guide judicial inter-

pretation, the courts would reduce the risk of a policy mistake caused by

the narrow focus of adjudication.
The first substantive provision of the Code embodies the approach of
Llewellyn and the realists:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial

transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.Y
The section emphasizes the need to look to commercial practice to
keep the law up to date. Custom and commercial practice inform much
of the law of the Code limited only by an overriding obligation of good
faith. 98
The Code's heavy reliance on merchant practice has always been a
source of criticism. Indeed, Roscoe Pound criticizing Llewellyn's jurisprudence a decade before the first drafts of the Code wrote:
[M]any of the new juristic realists conceive a law as a body of devices
for the purposes of business instead of as a body of means toward general
social ends. They put the whole emphasis on the exigencies of one phase
of the economic order. To them the significant feature of law is as a
body of devices for enabling business and industry to achieve certain
purposes. They give us a juristic version of what I have called the entrepreneur attitude toward law.9
One of the most perceptive commentaries on the Code echoes Pound's
criticism. To Professor Danzig, the Code represents "a renunciation of

95.

See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the

Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv.
395, 401-06 (1950); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 873-

75 (1930).
96. The most complete exposition of this method of statutory interpretation
is H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 3; see also Llewellyn, supra note 95, at 40001; Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388 (1942).
97. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1987).
98. See U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 4 (1987) ("usages of trade ... are the
framework of common understanding controlling any general rules of law .. ..
see also U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103(l)(b) (1987).

99. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HAgv. L. REv. 697,
708 (1931). Llewellyn responded to Pound's criticism in: Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
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legislative responsibility and power."'0 In Danzig's view, judges make
critical ethical choices under the Code "as technical assessments"' 0'1 often
with only the predominant "morals of the marketplace"' 02 to guide their
decisions. Danzig cites the many open-textured terms in Article Two as
instances in which judges substituted judicial law-making, on a case-bycase basis, for legislation. 03 The Code's major shortcoming in Danzig's
view was that it failed to exploit the legislature's superior capability for
making ethical choices. The legislature, being more broadly representative,
is a better institution for the normative judgments that the Code has left
for the courts.'04 Danzig also criticizes the Code for assigning these decisions
to judges on standardless, open-ended terms inviting the "projection of a
judge's values onto the scene before him."'' 0
While there is much to be said for these criticisms of Llewellyn and
the Code, the critics have somewhat overstated their case. The Code does

implicitly recognize the unique law-making ability of the courts and their
limitations while striking a balance between flexibility and certainty. The
open-textured provisions of the Code are not wholly standardless. On the
contrary, the Code directs the court faced with such terms to an evidentiary
inquiry as to commercial customs and practices.1°6 Indeed, as Llewellyn
originally conceived the process, the court would have impanelled a special
merchant's jury. 1' 7 Commercial standards do provide a benchmark which
is not the judge's own preference. Moreover, they are ascertainable by the
courts under the rules of evidence.108 Actually, reference to commercial
standards is the kind of inquiry most commentators have agreed the courts
do well. The court is asking about past practices or present circumstances.
By focusing on commercial practices, the input of the parties is likely to
be meaningful. They can inform the court about practices with which they
presumably are familiar. Finally, by focusing on existing practice a court
is far less likely to issue a decision that has a destructive and unpredictable
"pull" on other societal relationships. The web of existing relationships is
not disturbed. This focus, thus, limits the court from straying too far into
major social policy decisions with polycentric implications.
All this is not to say, as Pound and Danzig suggest, that under the
Code the courts must uncritically give their imprimatur to commercial
100. Danzig, A Comment On the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 622 (1975).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

630.
629.
634.
635.
629-30.

106. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (1987) (defining reasonable grounds for

insecurity by reference to commercial standards).
107. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
108. For an illustration, see 26 Am. JuR. PRooF oF
Abbreviation §§ 16-28 (1981).
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standards. On the contrary, the standard of good faith pervades the Code.? 9
It defines good faith as "honesty in fact." 110 In addition, the common
law devices used to police commercial transactions supplement the Code's
provisions. These devices would include the defenses of fraud, deceit, duress,
and estoppel."' With these defenses, as with the standard of good faith,
a court can perform the independent regulatory function for which it is
institutionally suited. With each defense, the court makes a fact-specific
inquiry of past events."12 It directs each defense to the conduct of the
parties before the court. Therefore, the court will be fully informed through
the process of adjudication of the facts needed to make its determination.
The courts can and should make ethical choices under the Code. The Code
simply directs those choices to questions the courts can adequately address.
As for larger questions, ethical questions with polycentric features, there
simply is nothing in the Code that prevents legislative action. Danzig's
criticism that Llewyelln failed to exploit the legislature's moral force ignores
the manner in which the states adopted the Code. It was proposed and
adopted to make commercial law more uniform among the states and more
consistent with commercial practice. The adoption of the Code, from its
initial drafts by academic lawyers through its final presentation to the state
legislatures as a finished statute, more closely resembled the drafting of a
Restatement than the standard process of legislation." 3
Experience has shown that the Code operates much like the Restatement,
serving as a framework for case law development which in no way impedes
legislatures and administrative agencies from making fundamental changes
in commercial law. In recent years, the legislatures and administrative
agencies of our society have repeatedly shown they are prepared to make
these changes, turning aside commercial practice in the interest of serving

109. Parties to every transaction governed by the Code are required to act

in good faith. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987). The standard of good faith is expressly
incorporated in many sections of the Code. See, e.g. U.C.C. §§ 1-208, 2-306, 2402, 2-403, 2-603, 2-615, 2-702, 2-706, 2-712, 3-302, 3-404, 3-406, 3-410, 3-417, 3418, 3-419, 3-802, 4-103, 4-108, 4-207, 4-404, 4-406, 9-206, 9-318, 9-401, 9-504
(1987).
110. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1987) (" 'good faith' means honesty in fact"); see
also U.C.C. § 2-103(I)(b) (1987).
111. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1987).
112. For examples of the type of fact specific inquiry called for by these
sections, see Laemar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970)
(duress and laches); Crawford v. Gold Kist, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 682, 689 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) ("good faith"); Dorsey Bros. Inc. v. Anderson, 264 Md. 446, 287 A.2d
270 (1972) (good faith); Melms v. Mitchell, 266 Or. 208, 512 P.2d 1336 (1973)
(deceit).
113. Origins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect Upon the Uniform Commercial
Code, 43 OFuo ST. L.J. 535, 543 (remarks by Soia Mentshikoff that the Restatement
was a model for drafting the Code); see also id. at 557-58 (remarks of Fairfax
Leary on the lack of fact-finding and the need to avoid interest groups).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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other social policy concerns. Indeed, most commercial statutes and administrative regulations of the past twenty years address consumer issues
invariably changing the legal regime to one more favorable to consumers
rather than businesses. For example, most states have passed comprehensive
consumer protection legislation. 14 The federal government has adopted
measures eliminating the holder in due course doctrine from consumer
sales," 5 controlling "high-pressure" door to door sales," 6 and protecting
consumer sureties." 7 Congress has adopted legislation regulating the terms
of credit,"' limiting the "float" available to depository banks," 9 improving
warranty protection 20 and protecting consumers from loss in unauthorized
electronic funds transfers 2 ' and credit card transactions, 22 restricting wage
2 4
assignments, 23 and forbidding abusive collection practices.
Most commercial lawyers would agree that the changes wrought by
these measures have been worthwhile. Certainly, it was better to make the
changes legislatively rather than judicially. Many provisions of these measures draw the sharp lines that courts find difficult to draw but which
legislatures or administrative agencies can mark off. 2 5 As a rule, these
measures reflect a degree of compromise balancing competing interests in

114. See, e.g., UNi. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. 17-230 (1985)
(twelve states have adopted the 1968 and 1974 versions of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code); UNi. CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcEs ACT, 7A U.L.A. 233-64 (1985)
(three states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act). Many states
have adopted non-uniform consumer protection codes and have established administrative agencies to protect consumers. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & CoM. ConE §
300 (West 1974); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 349 (McKinney 1988) (note the numerous
cross references to consumer protection statutes); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 3071 (Purdon Supp. 1989); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon
1987).
115. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1988).
116. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1988).
117. 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (1988).
118. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1686 (1982).
119. Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4014 (1987).
120. Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982).
121. 15 U.S.C. §, 1693(g) (1982).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1982).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982).
125. See, e.g., Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4002 (1987)
(specifying time limits and limitations on dollar amounts for funds availability on
deposited checks); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1982)
(delineating the amount of wages subject to garnishment); Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) (1982) (requiring specified notice within five
days of a debt collector's first contact with a debtor); 12 C.F.R. part 229 app.
D (1988) (requiring subsequent endorsements to be in "an ink color other than
purple; and ... 0.0 inches to 3.0 inches from the leading edge of the check");
UNnF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.208, 7A U.L.A. 113-14 (1985) (specifying content
of notice to be given to every consumer surety).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3
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the manner that is the hallmark of legislative processes. 126 Moreover, because
many of these measures are federal, they supply a degree of uniformity
impossible to achieve with case law under the Code.
In short, the Code creates a backdrop for a system of shared flexible
law-making in which each law-making institution in our society can do its
best work. The Code's focus on modern commercial practice to guide lawmaking enables the courts to fashion an evolving commercial law. The
process of adjudication can find customs and practices to inform the law.
The Code balances judicial acceptance of those customs and practices with
the inquiry on good faith. This inquiry, as it was for Mansfield and as
it is for the common law defenses to contract, will be a fact specific inquiry
one can expect the courts to do well. If a larger reordering is necessary
involving facts and parties beyond those involved in any given adjudication,
judicial restraint, implicit in the Code, would suggest the court defer to
other law-making bodies.
A proper inquiry into commercial practice will inform a judge's discretion in deciding to defer to other law-making agencies. Thus, the Code's
focus on commercial practice provides both a measure of flexibility and
restraint.
To demonstrate this, the remainder of this article will consider two
sets of judicial decisions interpreting provisions of the Code. The Code
provisions at issue in the first group of cases are those setting forth the
formal requisites of negotiability for promissory notes, drafts, checks and
certificates of deposit. These provisions are among the most formal of the
Code. Nevertheless, the drafters designed them to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate new commercial practices. Unfortunately, the courts
have not always appreciated this flexibility. Recent decisions holding variable
rate notes non-negotiable show that if the courts ignore commercial practices
they will render the statute unduly rigid.
A court's disregard of commercial practice can also lead the court to
fail to appreciate the limits of adjudication. To demonstrate this, the second
group of cases discussed below will consider judicial treatment of the Code's
provision on unconscionable contracts or clauses. Here, the drafters of the
Code hoped an inquiry into commercial practice would moderate a judge's
inclination to hold a clause unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. This
article will examine the price unconscionability decisions and recent cases
holding unenforceable limitation of damages clauses in contracts to print
the telephone yellow pages. By failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into
commercial practice, the courts in these cases issued decisions with farreaching polycentric implications.

126. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 52, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (remarks of

Rep. Wylie on compromises behind Expedited Funds Availability Act).
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NOTES: THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIABIUTY

Recent decisions involving variable rate notes illustrate why courts must
be sensitive to commercial practice to prevent the ossification of our
commercial law. In these decisions, the courts have held non-negotiable
promissory notes bearing interest rates that vary according to a specified
formula. 127 For example, the mortgage note involved in Taylor v. Roeder
carried interest at three points above the prime rate at Chase Manhattan
Bank. l2 Mortgage holders widely employ notes of this nature. Indeed,
29
many loans extended in recent years bear interest at variable rates.
The determination of whether a note is negotiable can be crucial to
a transferee of the note. A note must be negotiable for a transferee to
have the status of a holder in due course, one of the law's genuine favorites.
A holder in due course will take the note free from all claims and virtually
all defenses good against his or her transferor. 30 A transferee who is not
a holder in due course takes subject to these claims and defenses.' In
addition, any person obligated on a negotiable note can only satisfy that
indebtedness by paying the holder of the instrument.'3 2 On the other hand,
if a note is non-negotiable, the common law rule of assignment of contracts
applies. Until notified of an assignment, the obligor on a non-negotiable
note can satisfy the indebtedness evidenced by the note by paying the
original payee.'

127. Doyle v. Trinity Savings & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1989);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tegtmeier, 673 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Northern Trust Co. v. E.T. Clanoy Export Corp., 612 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill.

1985); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Krasner, 7 U.C.C. Rpt. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Goss v. Trinity Savings & Loan, 8 U.C.C. Rpt. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 726 (Okla. Ct. App. 1988); Taylor v. Roeder, 234 Va. 99, 360
S.E.2d 191 (1987); c.f. Klehm v. Grecian Chalet Ltd., 164 I1. App. 3d 610, 518

N.E.2d 187 (1987) (holding such notes negotiable with little discussion of the issue).
I am concerned here with notes which clearly specify the method of computing
the variable rate, and not notes, for example, which simply state some vague
formulation like interest at "bank rates," see, e.g., Centerre Bank v. Campbell,
744 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); A. Alport & Son, Inc. v. Hotel Evans,
Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 374, 376-77, 317 N.Y.S.2d. 937, 940 (1970). I am also not

concerned with decisions resting on alternative grounds for finding a note nonnegotiable. See, e.g., Farmer's Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Arena, 145 Vt. 20, 23, 481
A.2d 1064, 1065 (1984).

128. Taylor, 234 Va. at 101, 360 S.E.2d at 192.
129. See, e~g., Hiller, Negotiability and Variable Interest Rates, 90 CoM. L.J,
277 (1985).
130. U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-302 (1987).
131. U.C.C. § 3-306 (1987).
132. U.C.C. § 3-603 (1987).
133. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 338(1) (1981); U.C.C. § 9-318(3)

(1987).
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34
The case of Taylor v. Roeder1
presented the Supreme Court of Virginia
with the negotiability problem. In that case, a mortgage finance company
borrowed from investors pledging as security the notes it had acquired in
its mortgage lending. 35 After this pledge, several individuals paid large
sums to the mortgage company to satisfy the debts evidenced by several
of these notes. 36 These individuals never received the cancelled notes as
37
the mortgage finance company had already pledged them to the investors.
When the mortgage finance company failed, the investors claimed they
were holders in due course of the notes they had received as security. 38
The investors argued they took free of the defense of prior payment on
the notes to the mortgage company. Because the investors contended they
were holders of negotiable notes, they insisted only payment to them could
satisfy the indebtedness. 39 The individuals who had attempted to satisfy
their mortgage debt by paying the mortgage company naturally argued the
notes were non-negotiable. They argued, under the law of assignments,
that their payment to the mortgage company discharged the indebtedness
as the investors never notified them of any assignment of the right to
payment.140
The case involved an important question of policy affecting the mortgage
markets, thus, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie
Mac") filed an amicus brief urging the court to hold the notes negotiable.
The brief argued:

Without the ability to rely on negotiability of adjustable-rate mortgage
notes Freddie Mac would be concerned with borrower defenses related to
the enforceability of adjustable-rate notes on grounds such as failure of
consideration, borrower set-offs, and in some instances, defenses which
arise in connection with faulty disclosure by mortgage loan originators,
state usury law restrictions and state and federal truth-in-lending require4
ments.1 '
Notwithstanding the arguments of Freddie Mac and the investors, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held the notes non-negotiable. The question
was purely one of form to the court. The Code specifies the formal requisites
of negotiability. To be negotiable, a note must promise repayment of a
''sum certain.''"1 42 The comments suggest this meant a sum ascertainable
from the four corners of the note itself "without reference to any outside

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
at 26.
142.

Taylor, 234 Va. at 101, 360 S.E.2d at 192.
Id.
Id.at 101, 360 S.E.2d at 193.
Id.at 102, 360 S.E.2d at 193.
Id.at 102-04, 360 S.E.2d at 193-94.
Id.
Id.
Blodgett, Variable Rate Notes & The UCC, 74 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1988,
U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1), 3-106 (1987).
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source . . . . ',143 Thus, the court felt bound by the Code and it stated any
change in the law regarding these notes "should be made by144statutory
amendment, not through litigation and judicial interpretation."'
At first blush, the court's decision seems a model of restraint. The
court's method, however, is not the method of the Code. Indeed, the
court's emphasis on form and the inflexibility of the Code, could not be
further from the Grand Style envisioned by Llewellyn. The section setting
forth the formal requisites of negotiability expressly limits its applicability
to instruments "within Article Three."'' 45 The comments to that section
make clear, the drafters included this limiting language to afford a degree
of flexibility to the Code. The drafters intended that "some writings may
be made negotiable ... by judicial decision. The same is true as to any
' 46
new type of paper which commercial practice may develop in the future.'
Thus, commercial practice could establish new forms of negotiable instruments outside Article Three. While commonly criticized as the most antiquarian of the Code's Articles, 1 47 the drafters never intended Article Three
to be immutable. They designed it, like most of the Code, to change with
the times.
The statutory predecessor to the Code, the Negotiable Instruments Law,
had no similar "play in its joints."'' 48 Cardozo lamented this lack of
adaptability in an opinion concerning certificates enjoying wide commercial
acceptance but, nevertheless, were non-negotiable under the Negotiable
Instruments Law. 149 Addressing the argument that commercial practice should
supersede a formal legalism, Cardozo wrote:
We do not underrate the importance of permitting business to originate
for itself the methods and instrumentalities that may be found by experience
to be helpful to its free development .... There is force in the argument
that wider freedom of choice through the spontaneous flowerings of custom
would work a social gain. One of the debit items to be charged against
codifying statutes is the possibility of interference with evolutionary growth.
It is the ancient conflict between flexibility and certainty. So far as the
Negotiable Instruments Law is concerned, the remedy for the evil, if it

be one, is an amendment of the statute that will add to the negotiable
instruments there enumerated or described such other classes as the law
merchant or the custom of the market may from time to time establish.
Until such an amendment shall be adopted, the courts in their decisions
must take for granted that the Legislature is content with the law as it
is written. 50

143. U.C.C. § 3-106 comment 1 (1987).
144. Taylor, 234 Va. at 105, 360 S.E.2d at 195.

145. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1987).
146. U.C.C. § 3-104 comment 1 (1987).
147. Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIOHTON L. REv. 441, 461 (1979) (calling Article 3 "a museum of antiquities").
148. UNI. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§ 1, 5, 10, 126, 184, 185.

149. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
150. Id. at 52, 150 N.E. at 598-99 (citations omitted).
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Llewellyn did not want his Uniform Code to serve as a straight-jacket
for so fine a common law judge as Benjamin Cardozo. On the contrary,

his initial draft of the general provisions of the Code (Article One) directed
the courts to treat the Uniform Law in the Grand Style of the common
law. 51' To illustrate the method Llewellyn chose a negotiable document
case. Llewellyn entirely approved of:
the growing body of influential judicial decision which has properly and
wisely viewed the principles of Uniform Commercial Acts as warranting
development and extension by analogy in the same manner in which
judicially stated common law principles are developed and extended. Instances are Commercial NationalBank v. Canal Louisiana Bank ... where
the Supreme Court applied the principles of negotiable documents to a
document which was plainly within
the policy, but no less plainly outside
2
the language of the Sales Act."
The case, cited so approvingly by Llewellyn, still stands in the commentary

to the General Provisions of the Code as a shining example of the way
the courts should decide commercial cases. It simply was not the method
of the Virginia Supreme Court in Taylor v. Roeder.
The dispute before the Virginia Supreme Court undoubtedly presented
a polycentric problem. Certainly, it attracted formidable amicus curie. The
policy implications of the decision are momentous. Indeed, a thorough
treatment of the policy questions involved seem well beyond the institutional

competence of a court. A policy-maker might well ask whether making
variable rate notes non-negotiable would in fact chill their use. It might
not, of course, as buyers of mortgage notes might rather risk an occasional
valid defense in a collection action than the damage caused to an entire
portfolio by old mortgage notes bought at rates well below the prevailing
market. The case involves other difficult policy questions. If the secondary
market for non-negotiable mortgage notes constricts, will new or lower
income home owners be deprived of the best opportunity for buying a
home? Will it affect housing starts? What impact will the decision have

on the general economy? These are formidable questions demanding serious
empirical study. They seem well beyond the capability of the courts. Indeed,
a legislature or administrative agency would find these questions daunting
despite their ability to garner more information than any amicus brief
could provide.

151. Section 1-A of Llewellyn's Revised Sales Act reads as follows:
(1) In the construction of this Act, it shall be deemed to state the common
law principles of sales and of contracts to sell; and its provisions may be
applied, developed or limited as in the application, development or limitation of common law principles by judicial decisions; and construction
by courts of other jurisdictions shall be given the weight due them in view
of the dominant purpose of the Act to make uniform the law of those
jurisdictions which enact it.
I U.C.C. DRrFTs, supra note 5, at 326.
152. Id. at 327-28.
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The beauty of the Code solution, however, is that it does not require

the court to answer or even ask these questions. It provides a surrogate
53

inquiry. The Code simply asks the court to focus on commercial practice.
Under the Code, no formal legal doctrine should create an impediment to
a new commercial practice. In the market for mortgage loans, no legalism
should affect the consumer's range of choice.1 4 The question the Code
posits is: "Are variable rate notes in wide spread commercial use?" In
the Grand Style of Mansfield and Llewellyn the very currency of a class
of instruments triggers judicial recognition of their negotiability. 55 The
courts are institutionally equipped to conduct this inquiry. Indeed, it was
an easy job in the Taylor case. The parties did not dispute the ubiquity
of the variable rates note in contemporary lending.
Is the inquiry to commercial practice a perfect substitute for serious
study of the policy questions raised by the use of variable rate notes? Of
course not. Should the legislature address these policy questions? Perhaps,
but we cannot wait for legislation on all our problems. 5 6 The focus on
commercial practice enables the courts to do their best work in our system
of shared law-making. The courts are marvelous institutions for finding
facts like customs or commercial practices. The drafters of the Code hoped
facts like these would decide cases-that commercial practice would be a
source of law. The focus on commercial practice allows a measure of
flexibility in our commercial law while limiting the risk of a policy mistake.
The Code does not ask the court to make policy in any active sense but
rather to follow the existing practices. A method of deciding cases on the
basis of commercial practice allows commercial law to adapt in the Grand
Style Llewellyn envisioned.

153. U.C.C.
paper commercial
154. U.C.C.
flexibility so that,
it will provide its

§ 3-104 comment 1 (1987). The inquiry is "to any new type of
practice may develop in the future." Id.
§ 1-102 comment 1 (1987) ("This Act is drawn to provide
since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation,
own machinery for expansion of commercial practices.").

155. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (1758); K.
note 68, at 410-11.

LLEWELLYN,

stpra

156. The decision in Taylor v. Roeder forced the Virginia legislature to amend
its Uniform Commercial Code to make variable rate notes negotiable. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.3-106(2) (1965 & Supp. 1989).

Arizona, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia have also adopted statutes making
variable rate notes negotiable. A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-3106(B) (Supp. 1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.3106(1)(f) (1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-3-106(2) (Supp.
1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.3-106(2) (Supp. 1988); NEv. REv. STAT. § 104.3106(2)
(Michie 1989); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-106(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT.
CODE

§ 41-03-06(f), (g) (Supp. 1989);

1989);

WASH.

REv.

CODE

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 47-3-106(F), (G) (Supp.

§ 62A.3-106(2) (Supp. 1989); W.

VA. CODE

§ 46-3-106(0-

(h) (Supp. 1989).
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IV.

PRICE UNCONScIoNABiLITY AND Tr CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER
TnB YELLOW PAGES

The way an inquiry into commercial practice limits the risk of a policy
mistake can best be seen by taking up a few decisions based upon the
unconscionability provision of Article Two. Here, the courts have on
occasion forgotten their institutional limitations in making policy. Very

often, this lack of any sense of restraint resulted from the court's failure
to take account of commercial practice as the drafters had in mind.
Section 2-302, on unconscionable contracts, is one of the most opentextured provisions of the Code. The section never defines "unconscionability." It leads critics to charge that the section invites litigation, unpredictable results, and damaging judicial interference in a market economy
grounded upon freedom of contract.'5 7 Others, on the other hand, have
praised section 2-302 as an important safeguard, preserving the element of
"mutual free consent" which lies at the heart of any free market.'"" Again,
a focus on commercial practice to guide interpretation of this section goes
a long way toward resolving this debate. Considering its purpose, the
unconscionability provision is a useful safeguard. When courts ignore the
section's purpose, it is every bit the rogue its critics fear.
Karl Llewellyn intended section 2-302 to free the courts from the need
to manipulate doctrine to avoid enforcing an oppressive agreement. Faced
with a harsh contract, the courts, in Llewellyn's view, felt considerable
pressureto distort legal doctrines to avoid enforcing the agreement.'5 9 Courts
were prone to stretch doctrines like duress, mistake, deceit, and offer and
acceptance to find a lack of mutual assent. Probably worse to Llewellyn,
the courts often would interpret contract language in a way that avoided
an offensive result even though the party drafting the contract intended
that result. This led drafters of contracts to try again, spelling out more
explicitly, the unfair provision. To Llewellyn this was a disaster, leading
to "precedent after precedent in which language is held not to mean what
it says and indeed what its plain purpose was, and that upsets everything
for everybody in all future litigation."' 160 It was far better, in Llewellyn's
mind, to permit the courts to police contract clauses "in the open" using
16
the doctrine of unconscionability. '

157. For a classic critique, see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperors' New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967); see also Dusenberg,
Practioner's View of Contract Unconscionability, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 237 (1976).
158. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
159. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1987).
160. 1 STATE OF NEW YoRK LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT: HEARINGS
ON THE UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE 178 (1954) (Statement of K. Llewellyn) [hereinafter NEw YORK LAW REvIsION (1954)].

161.

Id.
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In response to critics who charged this gave far too much power to
the courts, Llewellyn responded that section 2-302 provides two important
checks on judicial discretion. First, Llewellyn emphasized the section made
the question of unconscionability one of law, not of fact. Llewellyn believed
this ensured that the courts would proceed in the incremental fashion of
the common law creating precedent that would give an evolving meaning
to a proper standard of fair dealing. The section forces the courts to
announce their reasons for their decision-reasons that would inform courts
and lawyers in the future.'62 Second, in drafting the Code, Llewellyn
struggled to find a mechanism for confining the courts to commercial
standards in their search for the reasons behind a ruling on unconscionability. The faith Llewellyn had in commercial practice is clear in one of
his initial drafts of the Code. In that draft, Llewellyn sought to regulate
the problem of adhesion contracts with trade association rules. Llewellyn
hoped to encourage trade associations to develop written expressions of
trade usage that would guide the courts in policing one-sided agreements. 63
Llewellyn hoped trade associations would draft form agreements for their
industries. To many people today, far more sensitive as we are to consumer
issues, this proposal must seem like letting the fox watch the chicken coop.
Llewellyn grounded his faith in trade usage on a conviction that commercial lawyers were more to blame for lopsided agreements than merchants.
Llewellyn believed commercial lawyers "insisted on all kinds of things their
clients [did not] ...

want at all."' 164 The clients, Llewellyn believed, were

"satisfied in the main with reasonable business judgment.., and [contracts
that did not] ... try to take more than 80 percent of the pie.', 6
While Llewellyn's trade association rules (so reminiscent of the New
Deal) never became part of the Code, the drafters in 1951, fundamentally
arrived at the current language which emphasizes the role of commercial
practice in defining unconscionability.'6 The Code today directs a court
to take evidence of the commercial context of an agreement before making
a determination that a contract or clause is unconscionable. 67 The Official
Comment states:
The basic test is whether, in light of ...

the commercial needs of the

particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable ....
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks

because of superior bargaining power.1"6

162. Id.
163. 1 U.C.C. DRAFrs, supra note 5, at 332-34.
164. NEw YoRK LAW REVISION (1954), supra note 160, at 177.
165. Id.

166.
167.
168.

12 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 5, at 328.

U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1987).
U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1987) (emphasis added).
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Underscoring the point, the comments to the general provisions of the
should presume fair, not unconscionable,
Code make clear that the courts
169
any established trade usage.
The test set out in section 2-302 and its accompanying comments
envisions a two step inquiry in any unconscionability challenge. 7 0 Llewellyn
thought long and hard about adhesion contracts. The two step process he
designed to police them is one the courts are institutionally equipped to
undertake.' 7 ' The first step in the process is a determination of whether
there was some flaw in the bargaining process that resulted in the disputed
contract. The court should focus, as Llewellyn intended, on what was and
was not bargained for in the agreement. 72 Certainly, this is an inquiry
ideally suited for the courts. It is this kind of fact specific inquiry, which
primarily involves the parties before the court, that our judicial system
handles very well. Indeed, this type of inquiry is similar to the process of
making out the common law defenses of fraud, duress or mistake, which
the law designed unconscionability to supplement. The second step of the
process, however, is equally important. The drafters never intended a court
to invalidate all unbargained for clauses. Rather, the drafters intended a
court to examine the commercial setting of the agreement before declaring
the unbargained for clause unconscionable. 7 3 The drafters recognized of
course that *substantial efficiencies resulted from largely unbargained for
standard form agreements. 74 They did not want to toss them all out. On
the contrary, the drafters hoped the courts would measure the reasonableness

169. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 6 (1987).
170. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 68, at 367.
171. Llewellyn favored a judicial approach to adhesion contracts along the
lines of this two-step analysis in a book review he wrote before the Code project
ever got underway. See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 704-05
(1939).
172. Id.; see also Llewellyn's lengthy quote from this book review in K.
LLEwELLYN, supra note 68, at 367 (discussing U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987)).
173. U.C.C. § 2-302(3) (1987).
174. Llewellyn remarked on the benefits of standard form agreements:
[S]tandardized forms evidence a real need. 'The general law' is much too
general. It needs tailoring to trades and to lines of trading. Nothing can
approach in speed and sanity of readaptation the machinery of standard
forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the particular
needs of that trade. They save trouble in bargaining. They save time in
bargaining. They infinitely simplify the task of internal administration of
a business unit, of keeping tabs on transactions, of knowing where one
is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfillment, orderly planning.
They ease administration by concentrating the need for discretion and
decision in such personnel as can be trusted to be discreet. This reduces
human wear and tear, it cheapens administration, it serves the ultimate
consumer. Standardizing contracts is in this a counterpart of standardizing
goods and production processes, as well as a device for adjustment of
law to need.
Llewellyn, supra note 171, at 701.
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of a challenged clause against evidence of prevailing commercial practice.

17-

A court could only strike a clause if, after taking evidence of commercial
practice and making an appealable ruling of law, the court found the
challenged contract unfair. This process, in the tradition of the common
76
law, would give an evolving definition to unconscionability.
Judicial inquiry into the commercial setting of an agreement is a much
more complex affair than an inquiry into whether certain notes are widely
used. The questions involved, however, are not beyond the competence of
courts. The inquiry will involve expert testimony in rather complicated
present circumstances such as prevailing commercial practices and the reasons for them. This type of evidence, while difficult to assemble, is not
beyond the reach of the litigants or the grasp of the court. It is crucial
to remember when reading section 2-302 that the drafters intended the
inquiry into commercial practice to check the courts from undoing too
much of the contract. 17 The New York Law Revision Commission reported
that section 2-302 was designed in part to inform a court's sense of restraint
because the section would "permit the court to hear evidence as to commercial practices and commercial experiences to aid it in determining unconscionableness, rather than to decide merely by the judge's experiences
and moral intuitions.' '17 The drafters did not want the courts to stray too
far afield in any attempt at social engineering when they hear an unconscionability challenge. Instead, the comments to section 2-302 expressly
direct the court to avoid tackling major polycentric problems like that of
adjusting the balance of risks in an agreement that resulted from disparate
economic power.

79

At the risk of making too pat a generalization about many decisions,
the courts seemingly have performed rather well the first task set out for
them in section 2-302. They have policed the bargaining process fairly well,
identifying what is known as procedural unconscionability.' 80 Nevertheless,
they have not performed the second stage of inquiry well at all in several
decisions (much of the blame for this undoubtedly lies with litigation
175.

U.C.C. § 2-302 (2) (1987); 1 STATE

OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoM655 (1955) (stating a

MISSION REPORT: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.

purpose of section 2-302 is to "permit the court to hear evidence as to commercial

practices ... to aid it in determining the question of unconscionableness") [hereinafter NEw YoRK LAW REVISION (1955)]; see also NEw YoRK LAW REVISION (1954),

supra note 160, at 178 (remarks of K. Llewellyn).
176. NEW YoRK LAW REVISION (1954), supra note 160, at 178.

177. Id.
178. NEw Yopx LAW

REVISION (1955), supra note 175, at 321.
179. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 2 (1987).
180. See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569,
1573 (D. Kan. 1986); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 366-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Truta v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 802, 814,
238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 818 (1987); see also Davenport, Unconscionability and the
Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121, 138-42 (1967).
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counsel). In far too many unconscionability cases little informed discussion
has taken place regarding the commercial context of a challenged contract.
It seems in these cases that counsel often has failed to present evidence
on commercial practice. In the very worst of these cases, the courts have
proceeded to invalidate forms in wide use without even considering their
commercial context.
A brief review of a few "classic" unconscionability decisions may help
illuminate how the courts have gone off the track in interpreting section
2-302. It is unfortunate in some respects that Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture' is the most widely read unconscionability decision. While there
is little wrong with the actual holding of that opinion, the procedural
posture of the case obscured the role commercial practice should play in
deciding an unconscionability challenge.
In Williams, two low income customers of a furniture store, challenged
82
the cross-collateral clause in the store's form installment sales contract.
The clause gave the store a continuing security interest in all the items
bought by these customers on credit until the customers paid for all the
items purchased.' 83 Thus, the clause enabled the store, after a default, to
replevy all the items purchased by one of the plaintiffs even though she
had paid $1,400 on her outstanding account of $1,800.184 The amount this
plaintiff had paid already was more than adequate to cover a number of
her earliest purchases but the cross-collateral clause made that irrelevant.
The District of Columbia trial and appellate courts both decided for
the store on common law principles of contract. They turned aside the
customers' challenge that the cross-collateral clause was void as against
public policy because Congress never had enacted any legislation to remedy
"sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings."'""
Reversing these decisions on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia ruled that courts could find the doctrine of
unconscionability, as codified in the Code, in the common law of the
District of Columbia.'86 The widely-read opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright
followed a line of reasoning that closely tracked the two-step analysis the
drafters of section 2-302 had in mind. First, Judge Wright asked whether
there was a flaw in the bargaining process which led to the parties'

181. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
182. The first reported decisions in the companion cases are from the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914 (D.C. 1964), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
915 (D.C. 1964), rev'd, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
183. Williams, 198 A.2d at 915.
184. Williams, 350 F.2d at 447 n.l.
185. Williams, 198 A.2d at 916. The Uniform Commercial Code was not yet

enacted in the District of Columbia.
186.

Williams, 350 F.2d at 448-49.
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contract.' 87 Here, clearly, the parties did not bargain for a cross-collateral
clause. It was complex and buried in a form agreement used with apparently
unsophisticated customers. 8 ' Karl Llewellyn would certainly have recognized
this agreement as the kind of adhesion contract he wanted to regulate with
section 2-302.189 Due to the procedural posture of the case, however, Judge
Wright did not undertake the second task the drafters of the Code intended
in any unconscionability analysis. Judge Wright did not review or discuss
any evidence to test whether the cross-collateral clause was unfair in its
commercial context because the trial court had never received any evidence
of commercial practice. Judge Wright correctly remanded the case with
instructions that the trial court consider the cross-collateral clause in the
context of commercial practice. 19 The legal standard Judge Wright set for
the trial court to weigh the evidence would have satisfied the drafters of
the Code. Quoting Corbin, Wright directed the trial court to consider
whether the cross-collateral clause was "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and
place."191
After Judge Wright's remand, we have no further report of the proceedings in Williams. We do not know what evidence the trial court received
of the commercial context of the parties' contract. At this stage, the trial
court might have compared the furniture store's installment sales contract

with those of other retailers. The court might have asked if there were
any differences between the forms used by retailers catering primarily to
low-income as opposed to upper-income customers. The court might, then,
have compared the rates of default among these different retailers. In short,
the court might have created a record to inform its discretion on whether
or not to enforce the cross-collateral clause. An appellate court could,
then, have reviewed the trial court's decision based on this evidence, creating
precedent informed by commercial reason as Llewellyn had intended.
There is no doubt judicial decisions on unconscionability handled in
this manner will tax the capability of the courts. Indeed, one might reasonably claim this kind of inquiry has polycentric implications not suited
for judicial resolution. It is important to remember, however, that the
drafters of the Code designed the inquiry into the commercial context of
a challenged agreement to check the unbridled discretion of the court. The
inquiry forces the court to see the polycentric implications of its decision.

187.

Id. at 449.

189.

See Llewellyn, supra note 171, at 704-05.

188.
190.

Williams, 198 A.2d at 915.
Williams, 350 F.2d at 450.

191. Id. (quoting 1 A. ConIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)). Llewellyn thought
of Corbin as his mentor and the two were extremely close. Llewellyn addressed
Corbin as "Dad." See Origins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect Upon the Uniform
Commercial Code, 43 Oro ST. L.J. 535, 540 (1982) (remarks of Soia Mentschikoff).
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To use Professor Fuller's metaphor, a person is far less likely to disturb
a visible spider-web than one stumbled into in the dark. 92 In unconscionability cases, the courts have on occasion stumbled into areas the drafters
of the Code never intended to lie within the reach of section 2-302. Some
prime examples are the widely-read opinions in which courts have found
price terms unconscionable. 91 Once again, these cases show a line of
reasoning in which the courts have pursued only the first part of the
analysis the drafters of 2-302 intended. In these cases, the courts invariably
find a largely unbargained for agreement. For example, when the seller
employs a complicated form contract in door to door sales with relatively
unsophisticated buyers. 194 Contracts of this kind deserve scrutiny. The
drafters of the Code, however, intended judicial examination of these
contracts to include evidence of commercial practice resulting in an opinion
that reaches a reasoned result based upon that evidence. Too often, in the
price unconscionability decisions, that searching examination and explanation were neither undertaken nor given. 95 On the contrary, one court
saw its mission under section 2-302 as one of protecting the "poorest
members of the community" from "gross inequality of bargaining96power"
and accordingly reduced the price term in the parties' contract.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to know what policies will lessen
the condition of the poor. It seems clear, however, that the process of
adjudication is not a well-chosen means of arriving at the proper policy.

Courts simply do not have the fact-finding ability, the means of monitoring
their decisions, or any expertise in dealing with the problem that would
impart confidence in their decisions. Indeed, the courts may have made
major policy mistakes in declaring contract clauses unconscionable primarily
because these clauses seemed to weigh most heavily on the poor. Professor
Schwartz has argued that unconscionability decisions may have made it
more difficult for the poor to obtain credit, goods, and services by eliminating incentives for providers at the low end of these markets. 97 Empirical

192.

Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 92 HAv. L. REv. 353

(1978).
193. Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979);
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964);
Token v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Central Budget
Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967); State ex
rel. Lefkowitz v. I.T.M., Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoss, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd on
relief granted, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
194. See, e.g., Jones, 59 Misc. 2d at 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
195. This is particularly true with Jones, 59 Misc. 2d at 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 264, and Frostifresh, 52 Misc. 2d at 26, N.Y.S.2d at 757.
196. Jones, 59 Misc. 2d at 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
197. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA.
L. REv. 1053, 1063-64 (1977).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

studies suggest Professor Schwartz is right. A 1968 Federal Trade Commission study, for example, found that retailers selling appliances to lowincome customers at prices much higher than those charged by other retailers
catering to a middle class clientele made no greater profit, after taxes,
than the other retailers due, primarily, to their higher bad-debt and collection
costs. 98 This study suggests these markets do operate efficiently.
The drafters of the Code never intended section 2-302 to authorize
social engineering by the judiciary. On the contrary, the section requires
a court to hear and weigh evidence of commercial usage before striking
down any contract or clause as unconscionable. Evidence of this kind was
intended to stay the hand of the court; to inform its discretion and sense
of restraint. As the New York State Law Revision Commission reported
upon completion of its study of the Code, the drafters intended section
2-302:
to provide a basis on which contracts might be preservedfrom destruction
on grounds of unconscionability. Thus, the section ... [was] aimed at
tendencies, observable in some decisions, to determine unconscionability
without adequate information as to business factors in the light of which
the assertions of unconscionability might be refuted .... ,99

The drafters understood that courts are ill-suited for certain tasks, such
as finding an appropriate price for a commodity. In a study commissioned
by New York prior to its adoption of the Code, Professor Patterson of
Columbia University responded to criticism that "woozy words" like "unconscionability" would encourage "wildcat" judicial decisions by stating:
[Tihe way to limit such vague norms is not to reject them as wrong but
to exclude them as for the present problem irrelevant. Thus if some
distressed buyer of goods, under the proposed Code, argues that the contract
for sale was "unconscionable" because the price that he agreed to pay
was excessive, the court's answer might well be that Section 2-302 is
irrelevant; a court is not authorized to engage in price-fixing without an
explicit authorization.The price unconscionability cases demonstrate that some courts applying
section 2-302 have not had the same sense of judicial restraint as the

198.
AND

FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT
RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS 16-21 (1968)

(noting low-income retailers had greater costs of doing business resulting from baddebt losses and collection efforts).
199.

1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT: RELATING

37 (1956) (emphasis added).
NEW YoRK LAW REVISION (1955), supra note 175, at 63 (1955). Patterson

TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

200.

and Llewellyn served together on the faculty of Columbia University Law School.
Llewellyn identified Patterson as one of the leading legal realists who shared with
Llewellyn central ideas of jurisprudence. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism,

44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1227 (1931).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/3

38

Veltri: Veltri: Role of Restraint

1989]

READING THE U.C.C.

drafters. The decisions of these courts often resulted from their failure to
take note of commercial practice.
A recurring problem concerning the yellow pages phone directory has
tempted some courts to forget the limits of adjudication. Once again, these
courts' decisions purport to rest on the doctrine of "unconscionability,"
but lack any informed discussion of the commercial context which the
drafters intended to inform that doctrine. Unsurprisingly, in upsetting a
contractual clause widely used in commercial practice, the courts in these
cases may have reached decisions with undesirable effects.
The problem arises when a telephone company makes a mistake in
printing the yellow page phone directory. Most telephone companies print
and distribute yellow page directories. These companies will accept virtually
any advertisement for publication in the directory in return for nominal
fees. Indeed, single listings are often free of charge. 20 1 Due to the number
of listings, however, a small number of printing errors occur in the directories each year. 202 These mistakes, of course, can adversely affect the
business or practice of the advertisers. To reduce the risk of substantial
damage recoveries by these advertisers, every telephone company conditions
its acceptance of an ad on the advertiser's waiving any claim for conse203
quential damages arising from a printing error.
Advertisers hurt by printing errors frequently have contested the validity
of these waivers. Most courts have upheld the validity of the damage
limitation clause in the contract. 204 Recently, however, a few courts have

201. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. C. & S. Realty, 141 Ga. App. 216,
221 n.3, 233 S.E.2d 9, 12-13 n.3 (1977).
202. The rate of error does not seem to exceed one half of one percent. Id.
at 12; see also Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 117
Wis. 2d 587, 599, 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984) (the phone company argued its
rate of error was one to two per thousand).
203. A typical clause limiting damages is:
The Telephone Company's liability on account of errors or omissions of
such advertising shall in no event exceed the amount of charges for the
advertising which was omitted or in which the error occurred in the then
current directory issue and such liability shall be discharged by an abatement
of the charges for the particular listing or advertisement in which the
omission or error occurred.
Southern Bell, 141 Ga. App. at 221 n.4, 233 S.E.2d at 13 n.4.
204. The rationale for each of these cases differs. See e.g., McTighe v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1954) (construing Vermont law)
("In entering into the advertising contract, the telephone company ... was free
to include in the contract a limitation of liability. . . ."); Vails v. Southwestern

Bell Tel. Co., 504 F. Supp. 740, 743 (W.D. Okla. 1980) ("[T]his Court has relied
on Oklahoma's Uniform Commercial Code as persuasive authority of the proper
procedure in a case of this nature."); Wheeler Stuckey, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 279 F. Supp. 712, 715 (W.D. Okla. 1967) ("IT]he telephone company's
liability, if any, arises from contract."); Georges v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 184
F. Supp. 571, 578 (D. Or. 1960) (construing Oregon law) ("[I]t may be that these
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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held the clause unconscionable, refused its enforcement, and permitted
consequential damage recoveries against the telephone companies. 205
These decisions emphasize the "take-it-or-leave-it" character of the
bargain between the telephone company and the advertiser. They stress the
telephone company's "decisive advantage of bargaining strength." ' 206 One

parties ...

cannot deal with each other at arm's length ....

But that ...

is a

matter for the Legislature and not the Court."); Mendel v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., 117 Ariz. 491, 494, 573 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
a refusal to enforce the clause "represents a departure from the majority view
recognizing freedom to contract, is based upon faulty notions of the public interest,
and is not in keeping with commercial realities") (quoting Robinson Ins. & Real
Estate, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 366 F. Supp. 307, 310 (W.D. Ark.
1973)); University Hills Beauty Academy, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
38 Colo. App. 194, -, 554 P.2d 723, 726 (1976) ("[I]f we were to void this
provision of the contract, it would make the telephone company an insurer against
consequential damages by advertisers."); Wilson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
194 So. 2d 739, 741 (La. Ct. App. 1967) ("The parties may make their own
contracts, and however unusual they may be... they form the law between them.")
(quoting Leon v. Dupre, 144 So. 2d 667, 668 (La. Ct. App. 1962)); Baird v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 208 Md. 245, 254, 117 A.2d 873, 877 (1955)
("We do not deem this clause to be an escape clause which relieves a contractor
from liability for violation of the contract. It merely limits liability."); Mitchell
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 298 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) ("[T]he
estimated loss was reached by estimate upon estimate, which left the whole matter
in the realm of conjecture or speculation."); State ex rel. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. District Court, 160 Mont. 443, 450, 503 P.2d 526, 530 (1972) ("The
mere fact of claimed unequal bargaining position does not render it so in today's
world of commerce, where situations of this nature are not uncommon."); Federal
Bldg. Serv. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 N.M. 524, 525, 417 P.2d 24,
25 (1966) ("Consequently the appellee was bound by its contract to be entitled to
exactly nothing."); Hamilton Employment Serv. v. New York Tel. Co., 253 N.Y.
468, 471, 171 N.E. 710, 711 (1930) ("[T]his court ... has gone on record to the
effect that those who are not insurers 'have the power to limit their liability.' ");
Gas House, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 N.C. 175, 184, 221
S.E.2d 499, 505 (1976) ("There are many other modes of advertising to which the
businessman may turn if the contract offered him by the telephone company is
not attractive."); Cunha v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 26 Ohio Misc. 267, 273, 271 N.E.2d
321, 324 (Ct. C.P. 1970) (citing McTighe v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1954)); Pride v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615,
620, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1964) ("In our opinion ...

wholly a matter of private

contract."). See generally Annotation, Liability of Telephone Companyfor Mistakes
in or Omissions from its Directory, 47 A.L.R. 4TH 882 (1986).
205. Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1985); Irish
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Colo. App. 89, 500 P.2d 151 (1972); Allen
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 638, 171 N.W.2d 689, 693-93 (1969)
("Where the contract is affected with a 'public interest' a court is more likely to
refuse enforcement to an exculpatory provision."), rev'd on other grounds, 61
Mich. App. 62, 232 N.W.2d 302 (1975); Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984); Discount Fabric House, Inc., 117 Wis. 2d. at 587,
345 N.W.2d at 417. See generally Annotation, supra, note 204.
206. Discount Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 593, 345 N.W.2d at 419-21.
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court that found the clause unconscionable described the contest as one
pitting "an individual versus a monopoly" involving a preprinted contract
entered into "without any bargaining." 207 In short, the opinions striking
down these clauses usually emphasize the first line of an unconscionability
analysis, an examination of the bargain. They tend, however, to ignore
the second step. Disregarding the wide-spread use of these clauses in the
trade, the courts striking them down do so with little or no discussion of
20 8
the commercial context of the clause.
Virtually all the courts which have considered the wider commercial
context of the yellow-pages agreement rule for the damage waiver. These
courts have found that the limitation enables the companies to provide a
convenient service at little cost. 209 Courts upholding the clause generally
have considered the telephone company's yellow pages as one of several
alternative vehicles for advertising, not as a monopoly. 210 Nevertheless, even
these cases lack a thorough record on the commercial context of the
agreement. They support the belief of the drafters of the Code, however,
that judicial consideration of commercial factors tends to save contracts
from invalidation for unconscionability.
One opinion in which a court struck down the clause after consideration
of its commercial context highlights the weakness of adjudication in handling
issues of this nature. In Discount FabricHouse of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Telephone Co. ,211 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a $9,000 negligence verdict for a fabric retailer against the telephone company. The
courts upheld the verdict despite the contract between the parties, which
limited the telephone company's liability to the cost of the retailer's ad.
On appeal, the telephone company argued that the low cost of the ad was
the quid pro quo for the limitation of liability. 212 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court perceived this argument as a "threat" that rates would rise if the
court struck down the limitation on damages. 213 Echoing an ancient maxim,
the court refused to consider threatened consequences as a criteria for
deciding the case. 21 4 The court forgot the reason for this commendable
principle of decision. The principle rests on the recognition that the courts
have neither the fact-finding ability to predict nor the institutional means
to monitor the consequences of their decisions. If courts limit their decrees

207. Rozeboom, 358 N.W.2d at 245.
208. Id.at 241.
209. See, e.g., Richard A. Berjian D.O., Inc. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 54 Ohio
1
St. 2d 147, 154, 375 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1978).
210. Compare Robinson Ins. & Real Estate, Inc., 366 F. Supp. at 310 with
Rozeboom, 358 N.W.2d at 245.
211. Discount Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 587, 345 N.W.2d at 417.
212. Id. at 598, 345 N.W.2d at 422.
213. Id. at 598, 345 N.W.2d at 422-23.
214. Id. The maxim would be fiat justia ruat coelum ("let right be done,
though the heavens should fall"). BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 751 (4th ed. 1968).
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to resolving disputes, the principle serves a laudable purpose: the court
will focus only on the past events giving rise to the dispute and will ignore
any future ill-effects. The principle has no place, however, if courts are
trying to make social policy-arrange the future. 215 After claiming to reject
consequences as a criteria for deciding cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
proceeded to act on its own intuitive sense of future effects. It opined
that as the error rate in the yellow pages was small, the cost of the few
mistakes each year could be spread among the phone companies subscribers
so that "a true case of damages due to the company's neglect will not
be an earth-shattering experience but rather one that is diluted many
times. ' 216 The court may be right but what are the attributes of the court
as an institution that would give us confidence in its "guess" of the most
desirable manner of spreading risk? The other subscribers and rate-payers
of the telephone company whose views were never presented to the court
and yet whose telephone expenses will increase as a result of the courts
decision might well question the court's competence to pass on this issue.
Ironically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to take notice in the
case that the telephone company had filed with the State's Public Service
Commission a tariff limitation on its liability for error in phone directories. 217
The court refused because the pleadings in the case had treated the dispute
as "a matter for private contract. ' 218 The irony of course is that the
supreme court proceeded to upset a central clause of that contract, the
limitation of liability. The decision neatly presented a choice among three
alternative social ordering mechanisms. The Wisconsin Supreme Court might
have chosen, as most courts have, to let the parties' own law govern, that
is, to enforce the agreement entered into between the two commercial
parties before the court. 2 9 Alternatively, if the court felt the phone company's publication of the directory was so cloaked with the public interest
as to demand public regulation, it might have deferred to the Public Service
Commission, an agency that reviews the phone company's rates.220 The

215.

Mansfield employed the maxim in an opinion emphasizing the principle

of judicial restraint-respect for the policy making ability of other bodies:
Unless we have been able to find an error which will bear us out to
reverse [the decision below] it must be affirmed. The constitution does
not allow reasons of State to influence our judgments: God forbid it
should! We must not regard political consequences; how formidable soever
they might be: if rebellion was the certain consequence, we are bound to
say "fiat justia ruat coelum." The constitution trusts the King with reasons
of State and policy.
Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 346-47 (1770).
216. Discount Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 599-600, 345 N.W.2d at 423.
217. Id. at 591, 345 N.W.2d at 419.
218. Id. at 592, 345 N.W.2d at 419.
219. See supra note 204.
220. For example, Judge Medina deferred to the judgment of the Vermont
Public Service Commission in McTighe v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d
26, 29 (2d Cir. 1954).
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court, however, chose the worst alternative from the standpoint of institutional competence. It decided to police the agreement on its own although
it surely has neither the expertise nor understanding of the problem one
might expect from the Public Service Commission or the parties.
We see then with unconscionability that the drafters intended every
court faced with the issue to examine the commercial context of the disputed
agreement or clause. The drafters intended this examination to inform the
discretion section 2-302 confers upon the court.
V.

CONCLUSION

In an area of law not involving the Constitution, the notion of judicial
restraint is grounded upon an understanding of the role the courts play
among other forms of social ordering. There is a fair degree of consensus
among lawyers that the courts are ill-suited for certain tasks but extraordinarily well-adapted for others. As a mechanism for resolving disputes
based upon claims of right and involving a careful examination of historic
facts, few would question the unique competence of the courts. On the
other hand, the courts have a number of institutional disadvantages in
setting social policy which implicates the interests of persons not before
the court. Social policy decisions generally require the evaluation of socioeconomic predictions rather than facts. Such decisions are often best shaped
by compromise rather than a "winner-take-all" claim of right, and benefit
by future oversight and adjustment.
The drafters of the Code had genuine concerns over the institutional
competence of the courts. Indeed, the principal draftsman of the Code,
Karl Llewellyn, attempted in his earliest drafts to enhance the courts' ability
to fashion what he perceived to be sound commercial law. As we have
seen, Llwellyn proposed such innovations as merchant juries and systematic
adoption of trade association rules. While these innovations were never
adopted, Llwellyn's approach to commercial law was accepted. The Code
is infused with the provisions directing the courts to respect commercial
practice and see it as a source of law. Along with the Code's regard for
private agreements, this approach guides a judge, who is sensitive to it,

toward an informed sense of judicial restraint. The Code, in short, mandates
respect for other forms of social ordering, that is, commercial customs
and private contracts.
The Code's focus on commercial practice is important in another respect.
The emphasis imparts an important measure of flexibility to the statute.
It does so by relying on real strengths of adjudication-its piecemeal nature
and its ability to find and evaluate historic facts. While courts have difficulty
fashioning rules based upon predictions of future events, they can quite
capably find customs. The rules of evidence and the judicial process are
easily directed toward this kind of inquiry. As custom is received in the
piecemeal fashion of the common law, our commercial law gains an evolving
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flexibility often difficult to achieve in a statute. Llewellyn's Code was
designed and is best seen as a framework for common law development
informed by commercial practice.
We have seen that the Code and its official comments do not countenance a break with commercial practice except where the court is likely
to be adequately equipped for the task. The invalidating provisions of the
Code all hinge upon a fact specific inquiry involving primarily the parties
before the court; fraud, bad faith, duress and unconscionability (at least
as the drafters intended the doctrine to operate). Where a proposed break
with commercial practice involves polycentric effects and persons not parties
to the dispute before the court, the Code does not permit judicial action.
The list of policies which inform the Code and which are to guide a judge
in making law under the Code do not include protection of consumers or
the redistribution of wealth. The Code wisely excludes these policies as
judicial concerns because courts are unlikely to serve them very well. In
general, the other law-making organs of our society are far better equipped
to pass on questions involving these concerns. They have repeatedly done
so in recent years with some success while judicial experiments along the
same lines have often been ineffectual.
In short, the approach the Code requires of a judge interpreting its
provisions involves an informed sense of restraint while preserving the
adaptability of our commercial law.
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